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Interest in the relationship between law and technology has been 
growing steadily (albeit slowly) over recent years. This is perhaps inevitable 
in a society which is increasingly dependent on novel and constantly 
evolving technologies which are absorbed at an incredibly fast rate into our 
every-day life. · i;,:A ..
. 4 ... Although relat1�ely a fledgeling field, 'Law and Technology' already 
contains many branches of specialisation and in most cases each branch's 
importance in the legal field grows in direct proportion to the increasing 
importance of the relevant technology in day-to-day life. Thus, if a new 
technology is particularly important economically the need for adequate 
legal regulation grows correspondingly. Hence the growing interest in 
protecting computer programs. Programs or 'software' 1 (the terms may, 
for our purposes, here be used interchangeably) are at the foundations of 
one of the largest growth industries of the last decade. The computer 
software industry is today measured in several billion dollars and the 
upward trend on the graph looks as if it's going to remain that way for quite 
some time to come. If we are to believe those who predict that our society is 
rapidly moving towards the age where every home, school and office will 
have a computer, the continuing strength of the computer software industry 
is easy to comprehend. The chief problem with software from the legal 
point of view is that a computer program is very difficult and expensive to 
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1. For the non-technical reader: A computer is a mechanical or electrical device for
processing information. Modern computer technology, although increasingly electronically 
sophisticated, is divided into what are popularly known as "hardware" and "software''. 
"Hardware" refers to the actual machine comprising the electronic circuitry, keyboard, Visual 
Display Unit or monitor, printer, etc., while ''software'' refers to the sets of instructions which 
enables the machine to process information. As indicated above, "software" and "program" 
may, for simplicity's sake, be used interchangeably. Thus, in a computer, the machine's 
circuitry, technically referred to as a Central Processing Unit (CPU) executes programs m 
order to process information. In plain English, the CPU does the work it is instructed to do. 
These instructions are contained on computer programs. 
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create but very easy and cheap to copy. It takes hundreds and thousands of 
man-hours to write and finalise a program, meaning that programs take 
several weeks and months to develop but they may be copied in minutes, 
often with the same ease that one records a phonograph record onto a tape­
recorder. What therefore must the law provide in order to adequately 
protect the author/owner's proprietary rights vis-a-vis computer programs? 
In researching legal protection of computer software, one is likely to 
encounter hundreds, indeed thousands of pages of literature written 
recently on the subject. One can scarcely hope to present a truly comprehen­
sive analysis of this topic in less than a hundred pages of print, and sueh an 
analysis is therefore necessarily beyond the scope of this brief article. The 
aim here therefore is to increase awareness of the need for legal remedies for 
problems presented by the widespread sale and use of computer programs 
especially with regard to the protection afforded by copyright law. The 
relevant Maltese statutes will be briefly examined and suitable reform 
considered from a comprehensive point-of-view. Again, although a strong 
case may be made for discussing the protection of proprietary interests in 
both 'hardware' and software together, this paper is restricted to an 
examination of legal safeguards of software only. 
In the leading U.S. case Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., Judge 
Sloviter neatly summarised a basic knowledge of computer programs as follows: "There are 
three levels of computer language in which computer programs may be written. High level 
languages, such as the commonly used BASIC or FORTRAN, uses English words and symbols 
and is relatively easy to learn and understand (e.g. "GO TO 40" tells the computer to skip 
intervening steps and go to the step at line 40.) A somewhat lower level language is assembly 
language, which consists of alphanumeric labels (e.g. "ADC" means "add with carry"). 
Statements in high level language and apparently also statements in assembly language, are 
referred to as written in "source code". The third, or lowest level computer language, is 
machine language, a binary language using two symbols, 0 and 1, to indicate an open or closed 
switch (e.g. 01101001 means to the Apple (Computer) add two numbers and save the result). 
Statements in machine language are referred to as writen in "object code". 
The CPU can only follow instructions written in object code. However programs are 
usually written in source code which is more intelligible to humans. Programs written in source 
code can be converted or translated by a "compiler" program into object code for use by the 
computer. Programs are generally distributed only in their object code version stored on a 
memory device. 
A computer program can be stored or fixed on a variety of memory devices, ... The 
ROM (Read Only Memory) is an internal permanent memory device consisting of a semi­
conductor "chip" which is incorporated into the circuitry of the computer. A program in 
object code is embedded on a ROM before it is incorporated in the computer. Information 
stored on a ROM can only be read, not erased or rewritten . ... The other device used for 
storing the programs . .. is a diskette or "floppy disk", a auxiliary memory device consisting 
of a flexible magnetic disk resembling a phonograph record, which can be inserted into the 
computer and from which data or instructions can be read. (Instead of "disks" some machines 
use magnetic tapes similar to those used for sound recordings.) 
Computer programs can be categorized by function as either application programs or 
operating system programs. Application programs usually perform a specific task for the 
computer user, such as word processing, checkbook balancing or playing a game. In contrast, 
operating system programs generally manage the internal functions of the computer or 
facilitate use of application programs." 714 F.2d 1 240 (1983) U.S.A. 
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Practice and analysis have shown that various types of computer 
programs may be protected to different degrees under different parts of the 
Commercial Law. Indeed, had it been the intention here to embark on a 
comprehensive analysis2 of the subject, one would have had to examine the 
varying extents of protection afforded by the Law on Patent, Copyright, 
Trade Secrets, Trade Mark Unfair Competition etc., but as indicated 
previously the following discussion is largely limited to one of the most 
important and widely applicable forms of protection: copyright. 
The importance of copyright is largely due to the fact that as far as 
computer programs are concerned its usefulness is not as restricted as that 
of other major forms of protection such as Patent or Trade Secret. This is in 
turn due to the intrinsic nature of a program. Although the author of a 
program may invest enough original effort in composing the notational 
sequence for the work to qualify for copyright protection, the effort 
involved is really the author's individual expression; the logic and design 
may be original, but the underlying principles of the methods used are well 
established in computer science. The element of novelty essential for 
patentability to exist is rarely found in programs, especially in the programs 
mass-produced for the micro-computer market, which is economically (and 
therefore, to a certain extent, legally) the most important sector which 
infringement of proprietary rights may affect. In his authoritative work3, 
Duncan M. Davidson points out that "Only a minute number of programs 
(perhaps less than 1 percent) are inventive enough to be patented ... Many 
programs have short product lifespans due to rapid technological advances. 
Patenting is simply not useful for their protection. " 4 
Although inconsistent at times, the recent trend in Europe and in the 
United States, is for Patent Offices and the Courts to deny patent 
protection to programs. On the continent this trend may be traced back to 
2. · For detailed analysis of the protection of computer programs under Patent,
Copyright, Trade Secrets, Trade Mark, Unfair Competition vide: 
Duncan M. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, Jurimetrics 
Journal, ed. Summer 1983, U.S.A. 1983 pp. 337 -425; 
Morton D. Goldberg, Copyright a(ld Computer Software - Protection, Preemption and 
Practice, Software Protection: The Computer/Copyright Interface, Law and Business Inc., 
Washington D.C. U.S.A. 1984; 
Peter M. North, Breach of Confidence: proposals for reform, 'Data Processing and the Law', 
ed. C. Campbell, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1984 pp. 171-193; 
James A. Sprowl, Towards a unified theory of proprietary protection for digital information 
systems, 'Data Processing etc.' op.cit. pp. 221 et.seq.; 
Schmidt, Legal Proprietary interests in Computer Programs: The American Experience, 
Jurimetrics Journal 21, U.S.A. 1981; 
M.C. Jacobs, Proprietary Protection of Software, Hardware and Data, Computers and the
Law 202, (3rd. ed. 1981) U.S.A.;
R.C. Lawlor, Infringement of Program Copyrights, Computer and the Law 208, (3rd. ed.
1981) U.S.A ..
3. Duncan M. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software etc., op.cit.
4. ibid. at p.357.
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as early as 1968 when new legislation in France excluded software, 5 and 
within five years neutral Austria and Switzerland, the Netherlands and 
Denmark in the EEC and even Poland in the COMECON sphere, followed 
the French example. 6 The 1973 European convention 7 excludes software 
"as such" from patent protection and this exclusion "as such" was 
introduced in a quasi-identical fashion in the United Kingdom in 1977. 8 The 
Germans followed close on Britain's heels and in a 1978 amendment, 
excluded "programs for data processing installations" from protection 
under Patent Law. 9 Meanwhile, in the United States, the Patent Office has, 
since 1966, been rather consistent in not granting patent protection to 
computer software although the Reagan administration brought with it 
promises of improved processing of patent applications at the Patent 
Office. The American Congress has done little to clarify the matters at issue 
in spite of being constantly urged to do so by the Courts. The latter have in 
three leading cases denied patent protection to the program in litis but have 
in no way decreed a total incompatibility between patent and program.10 
Indeed, two recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court indicate that in 
limited instances patents incorporating a computer program (as part of a 
larger process or apparatus which is patentable) may be upheld.11 Notwith­
·standing all these developments however the real obstacle to the develop­
ment of Patent Law as the major source of legal protection for computer
programs is not legislative carelessness or judicial prejudice but rather the
intrinsically unpatentable nature of most programs developed. While it is
true that both patent and copyright are concerned with protecting
originality the basic difference between the two concepts becomes all
important: the former exists to protect original ideas (i.e. new inventions/
discoveries) while copyright is intended to protect original expression. Thus,
one is inclined to agree with Bryan Niblett's conclusion that since "It is a
small minority of commercially valuable programs that contain novel and
non-obvious inventive matter ... the patent system is in no way a satisfac­
tory answer to the software industry's call for legal protection." 12 
Limited protection is also possible under Trade Secret/Breach of 
Confidence Law but again this is not practical in protecting the majority of 
progams since: a) trade secrets are most useful in the relatively small market 
catering for the larger computers, (main-frames and minis) where large and 
complex programs (often tailor-made) are licensed to a comparatively very 
small and restricted class of users, whereas in economic terms the need for 
5. FRANCE, 1968 Patent Law, art.7.
6. Soltysinski, Computer Programs and Patent Law: A Comparative Study, 3 RUTG.
J. COMPU. & L. 1 (1973).
7. Munich Convention 1973, art.52 (2) (c), art.53.
8. U.K. Patents Act 1977 S.1(2) HMSO.
9. BRO Patent Act S.1(2) No.3.
10. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Dann v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 219 (1976);
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
11. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981).
12. Bryan Niblett, Copyright Protection of Computer Programs fo 'Data Processing
etc., op.cit. p.197. 
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protection is more important in the world-wide mass market catering for the 
micro-computers which are invading homes, schools and small businesses; 
b) remedies against third parties in good faith (i.e. who are unaware of the
confidential nature of the program) are limited in most cases; c) there exists
difficulties in enforcing Trade Secret laws at the trans-national level,
especially with regard to procedural differences between Civil Law and
Common Law countries. In real terms therefore, while not excluding the
use of Trade Secret Laws where practical and applicable, software
industries require a simpler and cheaper method better adapted to
protecting thousands and millions of programs which are marketed (and
therefore potentially copied) world-wide, such as the programs used in
home and business micro-computers.
This brief, and by no means exhaustive, consideration of the relevance 
of Patent and Trade Secret laws, leaves us with Copyright as the primary 
(though not the exclusive) means of protecting proprietary interests in 
computer programs. The next stage of the discussion will therefore centre 
around where exactly one can find protection in Copyright Law and which 
are the problem areas of the subject. 
The almost universal trend has been to accept a program (or at least the 
source code) as qualifying as a 'literary work' and this has even found its 
way into the standard text books, 13 as well as into some statutes and the case 
law of many countries. The reason for this is that the copyright laws of most 
countries contain a fairly wide definition of what constitutes a literary 
work. The U.K. Copyright Act 1956 as amended, to which the Malta 
Copyright Act, 1967 may trace the inspiration and origin of a good deal of 
its sections and concepts, does not make any specific inclusion of computer 
programs under the definition of 'literary work'. At the same time however, 
as in most other legal systems (including our own) the U .K. Act does not 
require any evaluation of the literary merit or quality of the work. What is 
important for a work to qualify for copyright is that it is 'original' and 
published in a tangible form (usually printed or written). When computer 
programs are published, they are not normally made available to the public 
in printed or written form, but are usually recorded on a memory device 
such as a disk or cassette. This however does not alter the fact that the 
program was originally written by the programmer in some form of 
notation. As such therefore, under many systems of law, regardless of the 
form of embodiment (be it disk, tape, or even on silicon chip) but provided 
that it is fixed in a tangible medium, a computer program can be said to 
qualify for copyright as a 'literary work' if it fulfils the other criteria 
required by copyright i.e. the logic and design involved independent skill 
and effort in its composition and that the work is not of trivial length. 
When compared to the position obtaining in many advanced legal 
systems, the Maltese attempt at defining a 'literary work' 14 is clumsy, 
13. Copinger and Skone James, Copyright (12th ed.) p.154; Laddie, Prescott &
Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright 2.136, 2.10- 11. 
14. S.2: "literary work" in Malta Copyright Act 1967, Act No. VI, 1967; "literary
work" means, irrespective of literary quality, any of the following, or works similar thereto I 
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unimaginative and by no means comprehensive. In fact it does not define a 
'literary work' at all but rather it simply lists those works which the 
legislator wished to consider as copyrightable. A further handicap is that 
the Act uses the word 'means' 15 rather than 'includes' when referring to the 
list of items recognised as literary works. Although, at first glance, this 
would seem to hinder any extension of the notion of literary work to new 
types such as computer programs this need not be necessarily so. 
If the Courts were ever to be faced with a case before the law is suitably 
reformed they may resort to a liberal interpretation of what constitutes a 
literary work by taking into consideration the following criteria: a) although 
not specifically included in the list of S.2, computer programs are not 
explicitly excluded from the notion of a literary work, unlike "any written 
law, law report or judicial decision" which are specifically excluded; 16 
b) the phrase: "literary work means, irrespective of literary quality,
any of the following or works similar thereto." 17 As indicated above,
a computer program is a work notionally similar to more conventional
literary works. The legal doctrine on which copyright is based is the
intention to protect the proprietary interests of an author who has
invested independent skill and effort in the expression of ideas which are
embodied in some material form. Thus, the author of a book writes the
book in his own individual style (though not necessarily disclosing any
inventive processes) and this expression is fixed in hand-written, typed or
printed form. The material embodiment of a film director's talent is
celluloid whilst that of a musician or singer would be tape or disc. In the
same way, a computer programmer writes a program in a special notation
very much like the musician would use bass and treble clefs and other
symbols when composing a musical score. Since S.2 does not in any real
sense define a literary work, but 'rather gives examples, Maltese courts
would be free to examine the doctrinal notion of a literary work within the
concept of copyright and then decide as to whether a computer program
would fall within such a notion, using the modern criteria developed by
jurists, judges and legislators world-wide. Our judges should therefore have
little difficulty in following the example set by foreign courts in finding
computer programs copyrightable as literary works.
When turning to the position in the U .K. on whose 1956 Copyright 
Act, our own 1967 Act is loosely modelled, one finds that it has been 
generally accepted that, when reduced to writing, a computer program 
constitutes a literary work. Indeed the 1956 Act extends the definition of 
(a) novels, stories and poetical works,
(b) plays, stage directions, choreographic works or entertainments in dumb show, film 
scenarios and broadcasting scripts,
(c) textbooks, treatises, histories, biographies, essays and articles,
(d) encyclopaedias and dictionaries,
(e) letters, reports and memoranda,
(f ) lectures, addresses and sermons,
but does not include any written law, law report or judicial decisions;"
15. ibid. 
16. ibid. 
17. ibid. 
 
1984 
PROPRIETARY RIGHTS IN COMPUTER PROGRAMS 
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND MALT A 53 
literary work to include any written table or compilation, which is of great 
interest when discussing the copyright-ability of computer data-bases, 
which may be, in effect, original compilations of data. Until 1982, U.K. 
case-law had not yet produced any clear specific decisions on the copyright­
ability or otherwise of computer programs, 18 although many leading 
common law authorities on the subject were happily citing Northern Office 
Micro-Computers (Pty) and others v. Rosenstein, 19 wherein the South 
African Supreme Court found for a medical applications program source 
code in written and machine-readable form as being copyrightable under 
the 1978 South African Copyright Act which is similar in many respects to 
the U .K. 1956 Act and therefore perhaps some form of cousin of our own 
1967 Act in Malta. Should this decision prove to have any 'persuasive value' 
in the U .K. as well as in Malta this would be an added pointer to the 
increasing trend towards standardisation in the legal outlook of many 
countries in the field of law and technology. 
Since the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) came out 
with its Report20 discussing the pros and cons ot patent and copyright as the 
most suitable form of protection for software and concluded that a 
copyright-oriented scheme would be most suitable, the courts of the major 
developed nations seemed to have adopted a similar attitude. The nature of 
computer software as a literary work, for example, was highlighted in 
Visicorp v. Basis Software GmbH21 in the German Federal Republic where a 
'VisiCalc' program was held to be copyrightable as a "linguistic work of a 
literary nature" under S.2 of the BRD's Copyright Act. Davidson quotes 
recent decisions in France and Japan which held software to be copyright­
able under those countries' respective copyright laws.22 
While anticipating that courts world-wide will continue to find that 
computer programs qualify for copyright protection, it is undeniable that 
the judges' job would be made much easier by clarifying relevant statutory 
provisions through legislative reform aimed at introducing explicit and 
adequate reference to programs as copyrightable works. In the U .K. the 
18. There have been however a number of out-of-court settlements accepting infringe­
ment of copyright of computer programs. Davidson also quotes the following decisions 
available on LEXIS: 
Systematics Ltd. v. London Computer Centre Ltd. (1982); 
Formal Comm. Mfg. Ltd. v. ITT (U.K.) Ltd. (1982); 
Sega Ent. Ltd. v. Alea Elec. Ltd. (1981); 
Gates v. Swift (1982). 
9. Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd. and others v. Rosenstein (1982),
F.S.R., 124 (S.C. of S.A.). See for example, Peter Prescott, Copyright and Computers, 'Data 
Processing etc.' op.cit. at p.211; Bryan Niblett, Copyright Protection of Computer Programs, 
'Data Processing etc.' op.cit. at p.200. 
20. "Model Provisions on the Protection of Computer Software", International 
Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organisation, Geneva (1978). 
21. VisiCorp v. Basis Software GmbH, 1st Mun. Dist. Ct. Dec. 21, 1982 as reported at
9 Comp. L. & Tax Rep. No 8, at 4 (March 1983). 
22. P. v. BMV, (Paris Ct. App., Dec. 1982); Tatto v. I.N.G. Enterprise (Tokyo Dist.
Ct., Dec. 6, 1982); Duncan M. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software etc. op.cit. at p.414. 
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Whitford Committee23 and, more recently, the Thatcher Government's 
Consultative Document 24 on the matter both point towards British 
intentions of amending the Copyright Act 1956 through .new legislation 
explicitly providing that computer programs attract copyright protection 
under the same conditions as literary works, in whatever form the program 
may be expressed. Although enacted more recently than the U.K. 1956 Act, 
the Malta Copyright Act 1967 too, as indicated above, is crying out for 
reform, especially with regard to clarification and improvement of 
definitions. In reforming our statutes we can doubtless learn a good deal 
from the American experience. The United States has for a long time 
maintained its leading position in the field of computers, technologically as 
well as in the extent of applications, and this has also been reflected in the 
legal field. The 1980 Computer Software Copyright Act is the relevant 
recent amendment of the U.S. 1976 Copyright Act and is a commendable 
attempt at bringing the law in line with the requirements of a consumer­
based society which has well and truly entered into the 'technological' and 
"information" age. Other than the clear definition of the subject matter of 
copyright in general25 and of a 'literary work', 26 U.S. Copyright law now 
explicitly defines a 'computer program' as "a set of statements or instruc­
tions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a 
certain result. "27 Of direct interest, as Goldberg points out, is the U.S. 
House Report which establishes the view that "The term 'literary works' 
does not connote any criterion of literary merit or qualitative value: it 
includes catalogs, directories and similar factual reference or instructional 
works and compilations of data. It also includes computer data bases and 
computer programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the 
programmer's expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas 
themselves. "28 The growing ubiquity of the computer in advanced societies 
will, over the next decade or so, lead to the introduction of specific 
provisions (similar to the ones enacted in the United States outlined above) 
in copyright laws world-wide, with the U.K. and Maltese Copyright Acts as 
prime candidates for review. 
23. Report of the (Whitford) Committee to consider the law on Copyright and Designs,
(Cmnd. 6732, HMSO 1977). 
24. Reform of the Law relating to Copyright, Designs and Performers' Protection: A
Consultative Document, (Cmnd. 8302, HMSO 1981). 
25. U.S. Copyright Act 1976, 17. U.S.C. S.102 "Subject matter of copyright: In 
general (a) Copyright protection subsists in accordance with this title, in original works of 
authorship fixed in any ta11gible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from 
which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated, either directly or with 
the aid of a machine c:1r device. Works of authorship include the following categories: 
(1) literary works."
26. U.S. Copyright Act 1976, 17 U.S.C. S.101:
"Literary works" are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers or 
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, 
such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks or cards in which 
they are embodied." 
27. ibid. at S.101.
28. Morton D. Goldberg, Copyright and Computer Software etc. op.cit. at p.246
(emphasis added). 
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Until now, the discussion in this paper has chiefly centred around the 
suitability or otherwise of copyright as a means of protection, the trends in 
the case-law of some of the more advanced nations and the subsequent need 
for reforming existing statutes in a way so as to improve definitions as well 
as formally and specifically recognising computer programs as works 
entitled to protection under the legal noton of copyright. The next step 
would be to consider the main areas where problems may and are being 
encountered by authors/owners attempting to use copyright law to protect 
their proprietary interests. 
A. PUBLICATION
For copyright to subsist under many systems of law the work m·ust be
'published'. Publication under the Maltese 1967 Copyright Act, for 
example, means that the work must be "made available to the public in 
sufficient manner as to render the work accessible to it." 29 Our 1967 Act 
however makes a distinction between copyright "conferred, by virtue of 
nationality or domicile" 30 and copyright conferred by "reference to country 
of origin." 31 Thus, as the law stands today, if the author is a citizen of, 
domiciled in, or (in the case of limited liability companies) registered in 
Malta, it seems that publication is not required for copyright to attach to a 
work, but all other works must first be published in order to qualify for 
protection. This distinction follows that made explicitly in the 1911 Act in 
the United Kingdom, and in similar provisions of the U .K. 1956 Copyright 
Act. 
ls a computer program protected under copyright before publication? 
This is not a problem peculiar to computer programs but to all copyright­
able works, and the present position in Malta and the U .K. is regulated in 
the manner just described above. Yet, the moment in time when copyright 
attaches is a vexed question receiving much attention world-wide. There is 
today a growing tendency to place less emphasis on publication and attach 
more importance to the basic 'raison d'etre' of copyright: it exists to protect 
the independent skill and effort invested by the author in his work. In this 
iight the author/ owner is entitled to have his work protected as soon as it is 
embodied in a form which may be copied or stolen. The United States has 
thrown the element of publication overboard and as from the coming into 
force of the U.S. 1976 Copyright Act, copyright attaches as soon as a 
copyrighted work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression for more than 
a brief moment. 32 In spite of disagreement over details, American jurists are 
more or less insistent on the importance of computer programs carrying 
some form of copyright notice, whether published or not. In due course 
29. Malta Copyright Act, 1967 S.2(2).
30. ibid. S.4.
31. ibid.S.5.
32. U.S. Copyright Act 1976, 17 U.S.C. S.101. 
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more and more legislators (our own included, one hopes) will make the 
complete break from the concept of publication as a prerequisite for copy­
right to subsist and do away with the distinctions between 'home-spun' 
works and works of foreign nationals, such as those existing in Malta and in 
the U.K. Copyright infringement is very much akin to theft, and theft is 
theft wherever it occurs, and whether the work is published or not. Such 
distinctions are artificial and have no basis in a growingly internationalised 
legal doctrine. 
At the international level however, the Universal Copyright Con­
vention (UCC) of which Malta is a member, appears to extend protection . 
only on publication, and this is highlighted in the emphasis made upon the 
necessity of having the copyright notice placed upon works first published
in visually perceptible form. 33 The main problem here is that such an 
international convention is much more difficult to revise and amend than a 
municipal law and it therefore seems that trans-border protection of un­
published works will remain a doubtful matter for some time to come. 
B. LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT AND 'PRIVATE USE'
An interesting feature of the Malta 1967 Copyright Act is that copies
made for 'private use' are not an infringement of copyright. 34 Here we 
differ from the U.K., where until recently it was believed that "To record 
on a tape recorder, for instance, a gramophone record, even for one's own 
private use, will be an infringement." 35 In contrast, the 1980 amendments in 
the U.S.A. were quite specific in determining the extent of limitations on 
copyright with respect to computer programs: one is only permitted to make 
copies of a program by way of archival or 'back-up' copies or if the copy is 
an 'essential step in the utilization qf the computer program in conjunction 
with a machine and that it is used in no other manner. These restrictive 
provisions imposed an obligation of destruction of all archival copies "in 
the event the coritinued possession of the program should cease to be 
rightful'' as well as requiring authorization of the copyright owner for 
transfer of rights over the copy, which in any case may only take place as 
part of the transfer of rights over the copy from which such copies were 
prepared. 36 In comparison to the detailed nature of the U.S. provisions, our 
chief problem in Malta is again one of lack of definition. Our statute does 
not elaborate on the limitations or otherwise of 'private use' of any kind of 
copyrighted work, let alone newcomers such as computer programs. 
. . At first, the problem may not appear to be that great, especially from a 
practical point of view. Software manufacturers are not overconcerned with 
the many enthusiasts who make copies of programs on their home computer 
for their 'private use' as it were, since this anyway presents enormous 
problems of enforcement were it to constitute a categoric infringement of 
copyright. ·what they are worrie.d about is large-scale commercial piracy, 
33-. · Universal Copyright Convention, art. VI. 
34. Malta Copyright Act, 1967 S.7 (l)a. 
35. Leaper on Copyright, Stevens, London at p.101.
36. U.S. Copyright Act 1976, 17 U.S.C. S.117.
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where there product is copied and sold without authorization in direct 
competition with the original product. These considerations need not 
however deter a certain amount of speculation on the exact nature of 
'private use' in the law of copyright. 
Our local 'private use' seems to lend itself to wider interpretation than the 
American provisions regulating copying of computer programs. An 
emerging problem is that posed by the phenomenon of computer clubs 
blossoming all over the place, with Malta being no exception. One of the 
useful fringe benefits of these clubs is that members get to know of other 
enthusiasts with whom they can exchange programs with the sole purpose of 
mutual copying. This usually goes something like "I'll lend you my Space 
Invaders if you'll let me have your Galactic Battleships." Mild enough 
perhaps, but more enterprising computer club members have been known to 
make . dozens of copies which are eagerly gobbled up by their fell ow 
members (at a modest profit of course!) All lost sales as far as the rightful 
copyright owner is concerned! Computer clubs are usually encouraged by 
the hardware manufacturers but many software houses quickly realized that 
these clubs may not necessarily result in an increase of their program sales. 
· Are computer clubs covered by 'private use' or is copyright being
continuously infringed, albeit on a relatively small scale when using a 
commercial yardstick? Again, like the question of publication this problem 
is not peculiar to computer programs. The much-celebrated recent U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in the Sony 37 case upheld the legality of the sale of 
video-recorders which may be used to make copies of audio-visual works. 
Private, and especially home users heaved a sigh of relief. Can the same 
attitude be adopted vis-a-vis computer programs? When the legislator 
inserted the term 'private use' in the Malta 1967 Act did he intend it to be 
interpreted as 'domestic use' as Prof. Micallef has suggested, 38 or every use 
which is non-commercial? Does the Maltese connotation of 'private use' 
mean that private individuals may make copies of commercially marketed 
computer programs for his private enjoyment or may he make a copy only 
to protect the investment he makes when he purchases the program from its 
authorised manufacturer/copyright owner, as in the underlying intention of 
S.117 of the U.S. Copyright Act referred to earlier? If they wish to clarify
the,position, our policy-makers will have to take this decision when our Act
next comes up for review.
C. OBJECT CODES AND SOURCE CODES
This aspect of the subject has given rise to a good deal of argument and
debate and it has been better-explained if slightly over-argued elsewhere. 
The radix malorum lies in the realisation (by whom, has been lost 
somewhere back along the years of wrangling over the issue) ihat the object 
37. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., Docket N. 81-1687
U.S.S.C. January 17, 1984. 
38. Prof. J.A. Micallef, Copyright Law in Malta, p.4 Cases and Materials on the
Trader, Malta 1984. 
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code 1) does not formally resemble the source code from which it is derived 
and 2) it is merely a set of instructions to a machine, neither intended to be 
nor practically capable of being understood by a human. being, especially 
since programs are usually marketed in disks or tapes and not in written or 
printed form The foregoing have been raised as objections to the copyright­
ability of computer programs in object code form. (Computers cannot 
understand source code, which has to be translated into the binary language 
called the object code for the program's instructions to be converted into 
the electrical impulses necessary for the machine to operate. Therefore since 
most programs are distributed in object code, lack of copyright protection 
would be a serious prorlem.) 
Few people dispute that a computer program is written by its author in 
source code, in very much the same way than any other 'literary work' is 
written. The only difference is that instead of writing in English, French or 
whatever, programmers use a computer language such as BASIC or 
FORTRAN. So why make any distinctions between the copyrightability of 
source code on the one hand and object code on the other? I) Although 
formally different, object code is a precise translation of the source code 
and as a translation or derivative the program embodied in the object code 
is entitled to the same degree of copyright protection as the source code. 
This is because the expression, the logic and design of the program which is, 
after all, the real subjet of copyright, remains identical whether embodied in 
source code or whether translated into a different embodiment, the object 
code. 2) As will be stressed further on in this paper, intelligibility to human 
beings is irrelevant to the notion of copyright. In any case it is untrue that 
object code is indecipherable to human beings. A traned programmer can 
decipher binary objet code in the same way that a trained musician can read 
a music score. The fact that not all human beings can read binary or music 
does not detract from copyrightability. 
from copyrightability. 
Thus, slavish copying as well as laborious decompilation of object code 
to get at the original source code is a clear infringement of program 
copyright. On the other hand it is abundantly clear that an independently 
written program which performs the same Junctions as another copyright 
work is no infringement. One must not conufse expression (the proper 
subject of copyright) with Junctions. Everybody is entitled to achieve the 
same result using original effort and independent means. This is very true of 
computer programs. A program may be written in many ways, each 
programmer having a highly individual style; there are many routes to the 
same result and just about as many copyrightable individual expressions. 
The principle of the copyrightability of both object code and source 
code is winning universal acceptance and has been confirmed by several 
recent decisions in the U.S.A. 39 as well as in Northern Office Micro-
39. Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., Appl. Ct. 3rd Circuit (1983)
714 F.2d 1240 (1983). 
Apple Computer Inc. v. Formula lnternationallnc., 562 F. Supp. 775,218 U.S.P.Q. 47 (1983) 
1984 
PROPRIETARY RIGHTS IN COMPUTER PROGRAMS 
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND MALT A 59 
Computers (Pty) v. Rosenstein40 in South Africa. Indeed one gets the 
feeling that arguments about object codes not being copyrightable will soon 
be as relevant as red flags and 4 mph limits are to 'horse-less carriages'. 
D. ROMS
As in other problem areas, the major drawbacks of Maltese copyright
law in this topic are the lack of clear or real definitions of the subject matter 
of copyright in general and 'literary works' in particular. 
A program may be embodied in a number of different mediums of 
expression: i.e. written or typed in source code on paper, recorded mag­
netically in object code on tapes or diskettes and even on a ROM. ROM 
stands for Read Only Memory and this means that the program is stored as 
a pattern of electrical charges on the surfaces of a silicon 'chip'. This 
component is connected permanently in the internal circuitry of the computer 
and may only be accessed to via the computer's controls but may not be re­
programmed by the ordinary user. The arguments against the 
copyrightability of ROMS are connected to those against copyrightability 
of object codes in general, namely, a progam embedded in ROM 1) forms 
an integral part of the machine and 2) it is not an exact derivative of the 
program written in source code; 3) it is not directly intelligible to the human 
user. 
These arguments are invalid since: 
a) the program, (i.e. the logic and design which is the subject of copyright)
embedded in a ROM is identical to the same program when recorded on
tape or written on paper. It is simply embodied in a different medium.
b) intelligibility to human beings is not a prerequisite of copyright. This has
been accepted at law in a number of ways: i) e.g. in this context, Prescott
quotes the telegraph code cases in the U.K. in which it was held that a mere
collection of 5-letter groups, purposely meaningless in any known language,
was entitled to protection as a literary work. 41 ii) today sound recordings
and films are almost everywhere afforded copyright protection, yet phono­
graph records, magnetic tapes and celluloid film strip are not intelligible to
human users without a record-player, tape-machine or film projector to go
with them. The analogy to the program and computer is very close:
programs are either available on tapes or diskettes in a way that one can run
different programs on the same computer by the simple expedient of
changing the tape or diskette Uust as one changes phonograph records or
magnetic tapes when one wishes to hear a different tune) or else the
program may be embodied in a component, the ROM inside the machine.
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon. 564 F. Supp. 741,219 U.S.P.Q. 42, (1983) 
G.C.A. Corp v. Chance, U.S.P.Q. 718, (1982)
40. Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) v. Rosenstein (1982) F.S.R., 124 (S.C. of
S.A.).
41. Graves v. Pocket Publications, 54 T.L.R., 952 (1936-45)
Eanco v. Mandops, (1980) R.P.C. 213, C.A. 
Ravenscroft v. Herbert (1980) R.P.C. 193 
Peter Prescott, Copyright and Microcomputers, Data Processing etc., op.cit. at p.214. 
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which means that the program is installed internally on a permanent basis, 
instead of being introduced from the exterior. 
The main trend today is for copyright to be extended to programs in 
whatever form they may be embodied. The Americans have already arrived 
at this stage through a liberal interpretation of the requirement of 
'fixation'42 laid down in the U.S. Copyright Act, in a string of leading cases, 
namely Williams Electronics Inc. v. Arctic International Inc., 43 Apple 
Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 44 Apple Computer Inc. v. 
Formula International Inc., 45 Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon. 46 The British 
too are moving in this direction as may be seen from the recent U.K. 
Government Consultative Document,47 and one hopes that this aspect 
would find its place in a Maltese legislator's. scheme for amending our 
Copyright Act. 
E. COPYRIGHT ABILITY OF OPERATING SYSTEMS PROGRAMS
In his analysis, 48 Davidson discusses at some length the implications of
any distinction which may be made between a program's function in 
communicating to the human user and that of manipulating the internal 
operations of a computer. His concern arose chiefly from arguments to this 
effect raised in the hearing of the leading case referred to already, Apple 
Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. The practical difficulty lies in 
that many programs combine both functions to varying degrees, and as to 
whether operating systems programs are protectable under patent or 
copyright. 49 Davidson was writing when the Apple case was still pending 
before the U.S. 3 rct Circuit's Court of Appeals but he was quick to point out 
the fruitless nature of making such distinctions when discussing 
copyrightability: "The fallacy in the 'communication argument' is that it 
presumes that the copyrightable work in question is the functioning of the 
program and not ·the writing of it .. . a program need not produce any 
output to be protectable; it is sufficient that the original written program is 
found to consist of authorship, for that authorship is readable in the same 
way other literary works are readable.'' 50 
At around the same time that Davidson's article was published, the 
Appeal Court decided Apple very much in line with Davidson's own 
42. U.S. Copyright Act 1976, 17 U.S.C. S.102.
43. 685 F.2d 870,215 U.S.P.Q. 405, (1982).
44. 714F.2d 1240, 119U.S.P.Q. 113 (1983).
45. 562 F.Supp. 175-, 218 U.S.P.Q. 47 (1983).
46. 564 F.Supp. 741,219 U.S.P .Q. 42 (1983).
47. Vide Notes 23 & 24 supra.
48. Duncan M. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software etc. op.cit.
49. At this stage, it is worth noting that under Maltese Copyright Law patentability of a
work does not exclude copyrightability of the same work. This is implicit in S.3(3) or the Malta 
Copyright Act, 1967: "A design or model of manufacture eligible for copyright under this Act 
shall not, by registration under the Industrial Property (Protection) Ordinance acquire a term 
of copyright beyond that specified under subsection (2) of section 4 of this Act." 
50. Duncan M. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software etc. op.cit. at p. 373. 
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inclinations holding clearly that "Apple does not seek to copyright the 
method which instructs the computer to perform its operating functions but 
only the instructions themselves. The method would be protected, if at all, 
by the patent law, an issue as yet unresolved." 51 In delivering the Court's 
opinion, Judge Sloviter quotd the CONTU report (on which amendments to 
the U.S. Copyright Act had been based) in that "The copyright status of the 
written rules for a game or a system for the operation of a machine is 
unaffected by the fact that these rules direct the actions of those who play 
the game or carry out the process.'' 52 
The importance of clear definitions in statute laws is highlighted by the 
U.S. Appeal Court's reliance on the wording of the law: "Perhaps the most 
convincing item leading us to reject Franklin's argument is that the 
statutory definition of a computer program as 'a set of instructions to be 
used in a computer in order to bring about a certain result,' makes no 
distinction between application programs and operating programs." 53
If such a problem were to arise locally, whether at the legislative or the 
judicial level, it would not be unwise to consider adapting th·e basic criteria 
applied by the U.S. Appeal Court in Apple to our own needs. Since the legal 
concept of copyright is concerned with expression, a program would be 
copyrightable if it meets all other normal requirements of copyright, 
regardless of its function. 
F. COMPUTERS AS AUTHORS
The nature of copyright is to a certain extent inextricably linked to the
author of a work, indeed in cases of 'literary works' the duration of 
copyright protection is usually calculated with reference to the life (and 
death) of the author. If one were to advocate the acceptance of a computer 
program as a literary work, then one is compelled to discuss, albeit briefly, 
who is the copyright owner of a work partially or totally produced by a 
computer. In turn this question can only be solved by determining who the 
author is. 
In a world where CAD (Computer Aided Design) is being increasingly 
used in advertising to attract potential customers, denoting the extent of 
research that backs a product being marketed, computers can and are used 
in producing original works as diverse as drawings, symphonise and, 
commonly enough, computer programs. This problem has been mentioned 
in some text-books and examined in the U .K. both by the Whitford 
Committee and the Government Consultative Document. 54 The Whitford 
Committee considered three possible candidates for the authorship: 1) the 
author of the program used in the computer to produce the new original 
work; 2) the compiler of the data used �ith the program who is operating the 
51. Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 219 U.S.P.Q.
113 (1983) at p .1251 . 
52. ibidatp.1252. 
53. ibid. 
54. Vide Notes 23 & 24 supra.
62 ID-DRITT Law Journal Vol. XII 
computer; 3) Both 1) and 2) as joint authors. 
Even if one assumes that the computer is nothing more than a 
sophisticated tool, it would perhaps be logical to conch.\de that the new 
original work would not have seen the light of day had it not been for both 
elements: i.e. the program used and the data processed using the program's 
instructions. Both program and data were indispensable to the creation of 
the new work. 
In considering who should be recognised as the author, Bryan Niblett 
disagrees with the Consultative document's svggestion that the author of a 
computer-generated work is the person responsible· for running the data 
through the programmed machine. Niblett stresses that "The author of an 
original work is the person who supplies the originality and this is either the 
programmer or the compiler of the data - or both.'' 55 This conclusion is in 
agreement with the Whitford Committee's views on the matter. 
Basing themselves on the fact that the concept of the term of copyright 
of literary works is tied to the life of the author, the mainstream British 
attitude appears to be that only a human being is capable of being an author 
and that therefore a computer can never be considered as an author. If one 
accepts this premise one has to return to the considerations of the Whitford 
Committee, the Consultative Document and Niblett outlined above. In this 
case, Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria in what has become a standard text56 
come up with yet another alternative. Rejecting the notion that copyright 
ownership of a computer-generated work should vest in either the 
programmer or the compiler of the data, they suggest that this should vest 
in ''the owner or hirer of the computer who has expended the capital in 
setting up and operating the system.'' 57 The big snag foreseen by the 
proponents of this theory is where.such 'author' is a body corporate since 
then copyright protection could exist in principle, in perpetuity. What they 
recommend is a sui generis solution by way of legislation providing "a fixed 
period of copyright independent of any human life" 58 as is the case with 
photographs or sound recordings. Niblett would doubtless object to this 
proposal on the grounds that the owner/hirer may not have in effect, 
contributed any 'originality' as normally required of authors. Despite 
Niblett's objections, this latter proposal may be tenable if qualified in the 
following way: 1) where computers and programs are simply used in 
conjunction to produce a translation of another work (as in the case of 
'compiler' programs used to convert a program in original source code to 
machine-readable object code), this would clearly constitute an 
infringement of the copyright of the translated work; 2) where the new 
computer-generated product is manifestly or proven to be not really 
attributable to the investment and effort of the owner /hirer, then copyright 
ownership may be determined at the discretion of the court on principles of 
55. Bryan Niblett, Copyright Protection of Computer Programs, 'Data Processing and 
the Law', op.cit. at p.204. 
56. Laddie, Prescott & Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright.
57. ibid. at 2.140.
58. ibid.
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equity. It must be stressed that the entire topic of authorship of machine­
produced work requires legislative attention. 
CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY
In this analysis the following points have been examined:
1) The need for legal protection of computer software and the possibility of
protecting programs through a liberal and doctrinal interpretation of the
term 'literary works . . . and works similar thereto' under the Malta
Copyright Act 1967 as in force at the time of writing.
2) Amendment of Malta's Copyright Act, 1967 with a view to:
a) properly defining the subject matter of copyright in general
b) properly defining 'literary works'
c) clearly and explicitly recognising a computer program as a 'literary
work' entitled to copyright protection, regardless of i) the nature of the
medium in which the program is embodied and ii) the nature of the
program's function
d) introducing an adequate definition of 'computer program'
e) doing away with the distinction between copyright conferred 'by
reference to country of origin' and 'by virtue of nationality or domicile',
insofar as this adversely affects the protection of works prior to publication
f)  clarifying the notion of 'private use'
g) introducing provisions determining who is the copyright owner of
computer-generated work and what is the term of copyright duration in
such cases.
Although not specifically relevant to 'computer programs', which is 
the subject of this paper, one must make brief mention at this stage of the 
importance of ensuring copyright protection of computer data bases. A 
proper definition of 'literary works' which would clearly be extended to 
include "any original compilation of data" would clarify any doubts about 
the protection of the enormous effort invested in the compilation of 
computer data bases. This alone however would not suffice to stop up the 
latuna which would exist in the case of legal data bases since, as the law 
stands today, written laws, law reports or judicial decisions are explicitly 
excluded from copyright protection as literary works. The legislator would 
do well to qualify this proviso by a clear indication that this inability to be 
copyrighted would not exist where such laws, law reports or judicial 
decisions are incorporated in an original compilation such as a computer 
data base. 
B. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
While not ruling out the emergence of a local software industry, the
international aspects of this subject are, at present, of greatest interest to 
foreign software houses and their local representatives in search of legal 
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remedies to copyright infringement in Malta. The following discussion is 
concerned with the protection afforded in Malta to copyrighted computer 
programs not published in Malta. ('Foreign works' are granted copyright 
protection as soon as they are first published in Malta uhder S.5 of the 
Copyright Act, 1967.) This type of protection is possible under the major 
international copyright conventions: Malta is a member of the Universal 
Copyright Convention (UCC) and it continues to adhere to the 1928 Rome 
text of the Berne Convention. Under both conventions Malta is bound to 
apply the principle of national treatment, i.e. it affords the same protec­
tion to the copyrighted works of foreign nationals as that enjoyed by 
Maltese nationals under the Malta Copyright Act 1967. 
Before settling down to tackle the problems presented by Maltese 
copyright law discussed in this paper, a foreign copyright owner will have to 
consider certain provisions of the international copyright conventions to 
which Malta subscribes. Here, it must be pointed out at the outset that, 
although Malta is a member of the International Copyright Union or the 
Berne Convention as it is more commonly called, it adheres to the Rome 
text of 1928, not having been able to accept the Brussels revision of 1948, 
the Stockholm revision of 1967 and the Paris revision of 1971, due to the 
fact that our 1967 Copyright Act has opted for a standard copyright term of 
25 years which is below the 50 year minimum term now required by the 
Berne Convention as amended. In this respect Malta follows the standards 
set by the UCC and Maltese judges may be inclined to take this apparent 
preference for the UCC into consideration if ever called upon to decide a 
case. Since, however, Malta remains, to a certain extent a member of both 
conventions it may be useful to examine the salient points of both the UCC 
and the Berne Convention which may be relevant to the protection of 
computer programs. The definitions of literary works in both conventions 
are sufficiently wide to be extendable to include computer programs, but 
some problems may be encountered by copyright owners seeking remedies 
under the UCC. The Berne Convention as amended, affords protection to a 
work whatever the mode or form of its expression and therefore computer 
programs embodied in object code/machine-readable form would srem to 
be covered. The UCC, on the other hand, as already indicated earlier on in 
this paper, defines publication as the "reproduction in tangible form and 
the distribution to the public of copies of a work from which it can be read 
or otherwise visually perceived. 59 Since computer programs are for the most 
part available to the public embodied in object code on diskettes, tapes or 
ROMS and can therefore not be visually perceived (i.e. in such cases it is the 
embodiment which may be visually perceived but not the program which is, 
of course, the real subject of copyright), this may raise doubts as to their 
copyrightability in the terms of the UCC provisions. Since Malta's 
adherence to the Berne Convention has been rather qualified in the past it 
would not be unwise perhaps for copyright owners to examine Niblett's 
proposal aimed at satisfying the UCC's requirements: "As a matter of 
prudence, it should be carefully considered whether the sale or licence of a 
59. Universal Copyright Convention art. VI (emphasis added).
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published computer program in a country which is a member of the UCC 
and not of Berne should be accompanied by the provision of a tangible copy 
which may be perceived visually. " 60 
A second aspect to be considered is the question of formalities required 
by both Conventions for copyright to subsist. Whereas the Berne Con­
vention requires no formalities, the UCC prescribes that signatories will 
consider domestic formalities to be satisfied if the copyrighted work clearly 
bears the three elements of copyright notice namely: the symbol , the 
name of the copyright proprietor, and the year of the first publication. All 
three must appear on a computer program whatever its embodiment be it 
paper, diskette, tape or ROM 'chip' for copyright to attach under the UCC. 
If Maltese Courts were to hold that Malta's adherence to the 1928 text 
of the Berne Convention constitutes grounds enough for computer 
programs to be copyrightable regardless of the form in which they are 
embodied or non-compliance with the copyright notice required by the 
UCC, then there would appear to be little cause for concern. The foregoing 
arguments however remain relevant to a discussion of computer programs 
in a Maltese context. Malta's lack of natural resources need not deter the 
growth of a flourishing Maltese software industry since success in this field 
depends to a very large extent on human ingenuity rather than on an 
abundance of raw materials. And like other exporters abroad, any Maltese 
who would wish to tap a lucrative market such as the United States in order 
to sell programs whether in the form of diskettes, tapes or silicon chips, 
would do well to remember that the United States is a UCC member but not 
a Berne country and take the necessary precautions. 
C. THE LOCAL SCENE
Despite the fact that Malta, with a population of only 320,000 is a
relatively small market, damages resultant from unauthorised copying may 
still be counted in millions. For a long time now, anyone who cares to enter 
our capital city, Valletta, is assaulted by commercial piracy at every turn. 
Starting from the Bus Terminus, proceeding through City Gate and passing 
through the open-air market in st.· John's Square one is astounded by the 
roaring trade that exists in pirated music cassettes. The main culprits here 
are street hawkers who set up their stalls or open their van doors or kiosks at 
strategic points as the case may be, though certain music shops have not 
been above dipping a finger (or more) in the piracy pie either. Over the past 
two years or so we have had two relative newcomers arrive on the piracy 
scene: video tapes and computer programs. In both instances the copyright 
owners abroad are becoming increasingly anxious. 
Piracy of computer programs is increasing at an alarming rate since 
Maltese ingenuity knows little bounds whether as a cottage industry or on a 
more organised basis. In the present computer boom enthusiasts may 
perhaps be forgiven if, in trying to save every cent possible on program 
purchases, they do not worry unduly about buying unauthorised copies 
60. Bryan Niblett, Copyright Protection etc. op.cit. at p.205.
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(unlike music cassettes or phonograph records, the quality of a copy of a 
computer program does not suffer as much when compared to the original). 
Saving an average of two to four pounds on every program (sometimes 
more) means that one can build up a software library cheaper and faster. 
But if and when a copyright owner will seek to uphold his proprietary 
rights, from 'Space Invaders' on T.V. screens or monitors to 'Program 
Pirates' in our court-rooms the time lapse may be counted in months rather 
than in years. 
D. REFORM
In the same way that the study of the evolution of law is an indirect 
study of the evolution of human society, it inevitably turns out to be a study 
of the legal system's attempts to catch up with developments in society. 
Indeed, there .is a growing tendency today to measure the efficacy of a legal 
system by the speed of its adaptability to change and innovation in society 
whilst still preserving the desired standards of justice and social order. 
In the light of the above, what in the early years of study of criminal 
law, was a source of amusement, e.g. the penalties imposed by S. 352 (3) of 
our Criminal Code on anyone who "drives animals (whether of burden or 
riding animals) over a drawbridge, with or without a vehicle, otherwise than 
at an amble'', today, on reflection becomes a sad reminder of the tendency 
of statutes to remain static while life becomes more and more complex. 
Likewise it took more than half a century for the law to catch up on the 
copyright implications born with the invention of sound recordings and 
cinematography. (The relevant provisions were first introduced in the 
Copyright Act of 1956 in the U.K. and in the Copyright Act of 1967 in 
Malta.) In the field of computer programs millions may be lost as a result of 
the infringement of proprietary rights by unauthorised copying. One trusts 
therefore that the review of existing statutes and the introduction of the 
amendments as considered in this paper would help facilitate the 
administration of justice when the issue inevitably ends up in our 
Commercial Courts. 
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